Adopting the Euro in the new member states? by Bekx, Peter
1 
 
 
Adopting the Euro in the New Member States? 
 
 
Peter Bekx 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
 
 
 
National Europe Centre Paper No. 23 
 
 
Paper presented to conference on  
The European Union in International Affairs,  
National Europe Centre, Australian National University,  
3-4 July, 2002 
 
2 
1. Introduction 
 
The adoption of the euro in the candidate countries is an issue that has both an economic and a legal side to 
it. The economic side of the question deals with considerations related to the choice of an appropriate 
exchange rate regime for a particular country or group of countries. As for the legal aspects, these stem 
from the Treaty on the European Union, and the associated legal documents, which underlie the whole 
process of accession, including in the area of exchange rate policy.  While the choice of exchange rate 
regime for the accession countries is based on theoretical economic considerations, these will have to 
match with the Treaty requirements.  
 
The economic discussion, which is presented in section 2, does not only treat the accession countries, but 
more generally the exchange rate strategies of non-EU countries, belonging to the group of developing and 
emerging market economies,  which includes the so-called economies in transition. 
 
Section 3 deals more specifically with the candidate countries, analysing  the institutional and legal 
principles underlying the choice of an exchange rate regime for these countries, as well as the transition-
specific economic considerations affecting this choice. Section 4 offers some conclusions. 
 
2. The choice of an exchange rate regime 
 
The international financial crises of the 1990s have intensified the discussions about the choice of the most 
appropriate exchange rate regime. For the developing and emerging market economies, these crises have 
highlighted the new challenges created by globalisation and the development of international financial 
markets, which accentuate both the benefits of sound economic policies and the costs of policy mistakes. In 
this environment, the consistency of the macroeconomic framework, including the exchange rate regime, is 
of paramount importance. It is therefore not surprising that renewed attention is being devoted to issues 
such as which exchange rate regime to adopt and how to adapt it to changes in the domestic and external 
macroeconomic environment.  
 
Moreover, the international monetary system has seen the European integration process maturing in the 
creation of a single currency that has the potential to become a pole of attraction for emerging market and 
developing countries, which may consider the use of the euro as an element of their exchange rate strategy. 
 
2.1 The nature of exchange rate regimes 
Exchange rate regimes are usually classified along a continuum depending on their degree of flexibility, 
starting from currency union, as the extreme form of fixity, and ending with pure float at the other end of 
the spectrum.  Various forms of intermediate, or pegged, regimes try to compromise between fixity and 
flexibility.  Before entering the discussion on the merits of the various arrangements and the criteria that 
could guide policymakers in their choice, let us define the existing models starting from the least flexible 
one: 
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Ultra fixed regimes: 
Currency union: this arrangement, with a common central bank, represents the ultimate economic, 
institutional and political commitment to fixity1 for the participating countries.  In a less formal way, a 
currency union can also be the result of a voluntary or involuntary “dollarisation” process. 
Currency board arrangements (CBA) involve almost the same level of commitment to fixity than currency 
unions.  However, they generally do not imply any co-operation from the peg.  
Pegged regime or regimes with limited flexibility: 
Peg to a single currency: the country pegs to another currency, often a major reserve one, with the option 
of infrequent adjustment of parity. 
Peg to a basket: the country pegs to a weighted composite of currencies of its major trading or financial 
partners.  Currency weights are generally country-specific and reflect the geographical distribution of trade, 
services or capital flows but can also be standardised, such as the SDR.  The adjustments of parity can thus 
be frequent. 
Limited Flexibility vis-à-vis a single currency: the value of the currency is maintained within certain 
margins of fluctuation around a de facto peg.  
Crawling peg: is a variant that allows resetting the peg periodically according to a pre-announced path or to 
adjust it quasi-automatically in response to changes in selected quantitative indicators. 
Limited Flexibility within co-operative arrangements: this regime (for example, the exchange rate 
mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS)), which is difficult to classify along the 
continuum, merges a peg of each currency to others within the system and a joint float of the system with 
the rest of the world currencies. 
Flexible regimes: 
Managed float: the central bank supports the rate through frequent interventions aimed at achieving a 
”equilibrium level” that depends on a set of broadly judgmental indicators, such as the balance of payments 
position, international reserves, or parallel market developments.  Adjustments are thus not automatic. 
Independent or Pure Float: rates are market-determined, with limited official intervention aimed only at 
smoothing out adjustments, rather than at trying to establish a specific level.  In its purest form, the float is 
unfettered: rates are market-determined without intervention and economic policies are pursued with 
benign neglect for the exchange rate. 
 
2.2 Recent evolution  
Over the past two decades, many countries have forsaken currency pegs for mainly more flexible exchange 
rate arrangements but also for ultra fixed regimes.  This trend has even intensified during the nineties.  In 
1975, a vast majority of developing countries had some type of pegged exchange rate regime; by 1999, 
only a bit more than a third maintained this kind of arrangement.  When the relative size of economies is 
taken into account, the shift is even more pronounced. The shift towards flexibility has been gradual and its 
                                                           
1 Even this extreme form of fixity can be reversed as shown by the Czech-Slovak and by the FSU experiences. 
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reasons vary widely.  After the breakdown in 1973 of the Bretton Woods system, many countries continued 
to peg to the same currency.  Later, with the sharp exchange rate movements among major currencies, in 
particular the strong appreciation of the US dollar in the early 1980s, countries started to abandon single-
currency pegs for a basket.  The acceleration of inflation in many developing economies during the 1980s 
also played a key role by compelling countries with inflation rates higher than their main trading partners 
to devalue to prevent a severe loss of competitiveness. In the 1980s, many developing countries also 
experienced external shocks (steep rise in international interest rates, marked slowdown of growth in the 
industrial world, and the debt crisis) that often forced them to adjust the exchange rate level and/or to adopt 
more flexible arrangements.   
More recently, the trend towards more flexible exchange rate regimes has been associated with more open 
and outward looking trade and investment policies and increased reliance on international capital flows, 
and hence market determined prices and interest rates. In such an environment, the most advanced 
developing economies, the so-called emerging market ones, have often deemed that they were ill equipped 
to defend a peg.   
The recent financial crises has lent some credence to this view since most of them occurred in countries 
with pegged regimes and having important links to global financial markets.  This has caused some 
academics and policy-makers to argue that, in a world of free capital movements, only “corner solutions”, 
namely either let the currency float or fix the exchange rate in a nearly irrevocable way, are sustainable.  In 
their view, flexibility is one route since several emerging market countries with floating regimes succeeded 
in absorbing the shock wave.  The other option of an ultra fixed regime is also viable since a few emerging 
market countries, with a very rigid exchange regime, also weathered the financial turmoil relatively well, 
e.g. Hong Kong, Argentina, Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania.  In parallel, there has been increasing interest 
in official dollarisation or euroisation. This means the official adoption of the dollar of the euro as a legal 
tender in a third country. 
 
2.3 Theoretical considerations 
 
There are several theoretical considerations underlying the choice of a particular exchange rate regime. 
While this is an old debate, new developments during the 1990s have led to a renewed interest in the 
exchange rate question. Today’s literature on the factors guiding the choice of an exchange rate regime by 
developing and emerging market countries (henceforth called third countries) focuses on the merits of 
exchange rate based stabilisation in a high inflation environment, on the new constraints imposed by the 
globalisation and integration of capital markets, and on some political considerations, in particular in the 
framework of trade integration. 
 
A fixed exchange rate, by providing an unambiguous anchor, can help establish the credibility of a 
disinflation program.  Fixing the exchange rate is tantamount to placing an international constraint on 
national economic policies.  It eliminates the possibility of using discretionary monetary policy to insulate 
the economy from the rest of the world.  While this lack of monetary flexibility can be costly, it can also 
borrow credibility from outside.  However, the credibility that authorities hope to gain from maintaining a 
fixed rate has to be backed by a readiness to act according to the requirements of such a choice.  Monetary 
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policy is subordinated to the requirements of maintaining the peg, and fiscal policy must remain consistent 
with the peg, thereby “tying the hands” of the authorities.  The more fixity, the stronger the constraints.  
Under an ultra fixed regime, the government may no longer (de jure or de facto) finance its deficit at the 
central bank.  This disciplining should produce stronger fiscal positions 
 
Credibility of the commitment to fixity can have other advantages than limiting inflation.  It can be 
perceived as limiting the exchange rate risk, thereby encouraging trade and investment2.  This perceived 
absence of a foreign exchange risk could also help reduce sovereign spreads and thereby contribute to limit 
foreign debt service. 
 
However, fixed exchange rate regimes pose a number of challenges for emerging market economies 
engaged in a catching up process. Productivity gains in these countries may exert  pressures for a real 
exchange rate appreciation, which can be achieved either through a nominal exchange rate appreciation or 
domestic price inflation. Inflationary pressures may be compounded by the capital inflows necessary to 
fuel GDP growth and to facilitate the transfer of technology. The tension between inflation and nominal 
exchange rate appreciation exacerbates the risk of a sudden turnaround in market sentiment. These 
countries would probably benefit from adopting a more flexible exchange rate regime. 
 
By definition, the main advantage of flexibility is that it allows a country to pursue an independent 
monetary policy.  It allows discretion by keeping national economic policy free from international 
constraints. In case of need, the authorities can use the exchange rate flexibility to adjust the economy. This 
brings more rapidly steam back in the economy than would the case under a fixed regime. 
Some countries however are not prepared to bear the costs and economic consequences of a freely floating 
exchange rate. Small and open economies that can be highly affected by exchange rate fluctuations often 
prefer to opt for a pegged exchange rate regime, and rely on the flexibility of their fiscal policies, their 
labour and products markets and on a diversified production structure.  They are generally relatively 
integrated to a country to which it is pegged and face shocks comparable to those faced by the country to 
which they peg.  Of course high international reserves can help to reinforce the credibility of their peg.  
 
2.4 The time dimension 
 
It  is  important to include the time dimension in the choice of an appropriate exchange rate regime, 
including the idea of sequencing. In particular circumstances, e.g. in post-chaos economies with a strong 
need to import monetary stability, fixing the exchange rate can help in establishing the credibility of a 
disinflation programme. The resulting limitation of exchange rate risk should help in encouraging trade and 
investment, as well as in reducing sovereign spreads, thereby contributing to lowering foreign debt service.  
 
                                                           
2 Though theoretically, excessive exchange rate variability seems at odds with a free-trade area or a single internal 
market, empirical studies have not been able to prove unambiguously that exchange rate volatility has adverse effects 
on trade and investment.  It is probably a question of degree since the EMU experience of sharing a common currency 
is widely perceived as stimulating trade and economic integration.   
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For countries engaged in a catching up process, however, which become more integrated into global 
financial markets, there may be tensions resulting from the necessary inflow of capital and its impact on 
domestic inflation and international competitiveness. Also the productivity gains associated with the 
catching-up process may exert strong pressure on the price level in these countries, which would therefore 
benefit from a floating exchange rate regime.  
 
More mature economies, in particular when they are highly integrated with their neighbours, may again 
benefit from greater fixity in the framework of a currency union. The choice of an exchange rate regime is 
the result of trade-offs that need to take into account the specific internal and external circumstances of a 
country. Given that these change over time, the appropriateness of an exchange rate regime should also 
take into account the extent by which regime changes are possible. The main conclusion is thus: no 
exchange rate regime is right for all countries or at all times. The optimal choice will vary from one 
country to another, depending on a number of economic characteristics. Given that these may change over 
time, also the optimal exchange rate regime for a particular country may evolve over time. It is thus 
important to opt for regimes which allow for such changes to take place rather smoothly.  
 
 
3. Exchange rate regimes in the candidate countries3 
 
The exchange rate policy of the candidate countries is already now constrained by the fact that these 
countries will, in a couple of years time, join the EU. As such, they will adopt the whole acquis 
communautaire, which includes, eventually, the adoption of the euro. 
 
3.1 No adoption of the euro upon accession  
The process of monetary integration for the current and future Member States in the EU is defined in the 
Treaty and associated legal documents. A first, very important constraint is that since 1 January 1999, the 
EU is in the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union. This has a number of implications, and it means 
for example that an EU member state is either a member of the euro area, or a member state with a 
derogation. There are no other possibilities, as the EU is not prepared to grant any opt outs to the accession 
countries. These countries can not become member of the euro area upon accession, as this possibility is 
not allowed by the Treaty. The Treaty lays down the whole procedure that needs to be followed for a 
country in order to become member of the euro area (in art. 121 and 122).  This procedure includes the 
requirement to observe the normal fluctuation margins of the ERM for at least two years. But a country can 
not join the ERM before it has become a member of the EU, so that, at least during two years, the 
candidate countries will not be in the possibility to become member of the euro area.  
 
Besides these purely legalistic reasons, there are also economic reasons why the candidate countries should 
not adopt the euro immediately upon accession. The institutional and economic policy choices of the 
candidate countries must reflect the same economic rationale and sequencing as the one that was applied to 
                                                           
3 The viewpoint on the optimal exchange rate policy for the candidate countries was adopted by the ECOFIN-Council 
in November 2000, and was endorsed by the Nice European Council in December 2000.  
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the existing EU Member States. This rationale pertains to the need for having achieved a sufficient degree 
of nominal convergence, before joining the euro area. 
The participation in the euro area of the new Member States will take place when they comply with the 
conditions for the adoption of the single currency, i.e. the achievement of a high degree of sustainable 
convergence.  
Although the economic criteria for accession demand a sufficient degree of macroeconomic stability to 
create a functioning and competitive market economy, too strict nominal convergence policies before 
accession would not always create the appropriate framework for rapid real convergence, especially for 
those countries where the necessary catching-up effort remains significant. The risks are that the candidates 
would rigidly orient their policies toward compliance with the convergence criteria in an effort to adopt the 
euro at the earliest possible opportunity after accession. Indeed, several of the candidates have already 
expressed an aspiration to adopt the euro very soon after accession. This is not in their interest, and the new 
member states  will join the EU with the status of member state with a derogation. 
 
3.2 A staged process for the adoption of the euro 
Based on the treaty,  one can identify three distinct phases for the monetary integration of current candidate 
countries: 
(1) The pre–accesion phase; 
(2) The accession phase, covering the period from the date of accession to adoption of the single 
currency; 
(3) The final phase of the adoption of the euro.  
During the pre-accession phase, candidate countries carry out the economic reforms and policies needed to 
fulfil the Copenhagen economic criteria. The Copenhagen criteria relate to the existence of a functioning 
market economy in the country under consideration, as well as to its capability to cope with the 
competition in the Single Market. The Commission Services have developed a number of criteria on how 
to assess a country’s compliance with both criteria. These are not related to the exchange rate regime. That 
implies, that in principle these countries can adopt whatever exchange rate regime they wish to prior to 
accession. 
 They also adopt and implement the required EMU-related legislation to become a Member State with a 
derogation: 
• Completion of the orderly liberalisation of capital movements (Art. 56). 
• Prohibition of any direct public sector financing by the central bank (Art. 101) and of privileged access 
of the public sector to financial institutions (Art 102). 
• Alignment of the national central bank statutes with the Treaty, including the independence of the 
monetary authorities (Art. 108, 109). 
After accession, according to Article 122(2), a Member State with a derogation can request at any time the 
application of Article 121(1) to determine if it fulfils the necessary conditions to adopt the euro, and to 
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abrogate the derogation. Otherwise, according to the same Article, the procedure will be applied at least 
once every two years. 
 
In view of the proper sequencing of economic integration, it is important to stress that participation in 
EMU presupposes participation in the Single market. The establishment of the Single market preceded the 
completion of EMU and the adoption of the euro, for present Member States. By the time of accession, the 
full liberalisation of capital movements will be largely accomplished, except for any transition measures 
that may have been obtained during accession negotiations. Similarly, the free movement of goods,  
services and persons will be largely implemented except for any transition measures. 
 
During the accession phase, the candidate countries will have  to comply with the relevant Treaty 
provisions as a Member State with a derogation:  
• Treatment of exchange rate policy as a matter of common interest and, at some stage, participation in 
the exchange rate mechanism (Art. 124). 
• Treatment of economic policies as a matter of common concern and co-ordination of economic 
policies between the Member States through participation in Community procedures (Arts. 98 and 99).  
• Avoidance of excessive government deficits and adherence to the relevant provisions of the stability 
and growth pact (Art. 104). 
• Further adaptation of the national central bank's statutes with a view to integration in the ESCB (Art. 
109). 
• Progress towards the achievement of a high degree of sustainable convergence (Art.121). 
 
From the point of view of economic and monetary integration, the policy sequencing should be oriented 
first to  a completion of market reforms with progressive integration in the Single market and gradual 
adoption of the rules pertaining to it. When this stage is completed, the accession will happen with 
participation in the single market and in EMU as a country with a derogation from the adoption of the euro. 
Adoption of the euro will follow when a high degree of sustainable convergence has been demonstrated 
within the Single market. These policy considerations should therefore be the overriding concern of the 
candidate countries in the definition of their strategies. 
 
3.3 Shifts in exchange rate strategies to date 
There has been already an extensive evolution in the candidate countries in exchange rate arrangements 
and regimes to date. Practically all countries have experienced at least one exchange rate regime change 
during the transition. Some countries have experienced a spectrum of different regimes during that period, 
either through progressive and orderly adaptations (Poland) or through forced exit (Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Slovak Republic). 
While it is difficult to detect a clear pattern, there seems to have been a shift away from the more 
intermediate regimes towards “corner solutions”, mostly in the direction of more flexibility. However, 
given that the types of exit have differed significantly (orderly or through exchange rate crisis or failed 
stabilisation attempts), and that some countries have experienced successive changes while others have 
successfully maintained long-standing arrangements, it is difficult to identify a pattern or a trend in regime 
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shifts. This in itself supports the premise that exchange rate regimes are not the key policy element for 
success. 
 
Moreover, candidate countries with differing exchange rate regimes and monetary frameworks but 
committed to structural reforms and fiscal accountability have managed to record success in economic 
performance and in reducing inflation. This achievement emphasises that the importance of exchange rate 
regimes should not be overestimated.  
 
3.4 Factors determining the exchange rate regime choice 
 
There are specific, transition-related factors, that affect the exchange rate regime choice in the pre-
accession phase in the ten candidate countries going through transition. 
 
3.4.1 Changing disinflation strategies 
 
In the initial stage of transition, when markets are non-existent, relative prices distorted, and hyperinflation 
and macro-economic instability require urgent solutions, a fixed exchange rate regime can be a useful 
instrument by anchoring the price of tradables to prices prevailing abroad. The peg of the exchange rate to 
that of a country with low inflation will tend to produce low domestic inflation.  
In such a chaos economy, monetary policy is not effective in combatting inflation. The financial sector is 
still very weak and suffers from recurring banking sector crises, while the instability in the demand for 
money and other financial assets, together with strong real supply-side shocks, make it impossible to 
accurately forecast money demand. Also the actual tools to regulate money supply are inappropriate in 
such circumstances. Another argument for initial exchange rate pegs is the likelihood of exchange rate 
overshooting during money-based stabilisation. In addition, a peg bolsters the government's commitment to 
the stabilisation effort by establishing clear targets and by tying the government’s own hands, especially 
when public finances are still weak. Exchange rate stabilisation has been most successful in countries with 
hyperinflation and it has produced, as an added benefit, the reduction of nominal rigidities and backward 
looking indexation. The Baltic countries, particularly Estonia, and more recently Bulgaria are such 
examples in the candidate countries. 
 
However, policy priorities can change once this initial stabilisation is accomplished. When inflation is no 
longer at hyperinflation levels, but a lower level of 10-30% is reached, real money demand can stabilise 
significantly and the underlying equilibrium real exchange rate can appreciate substantially, both because 
of a reversal in the early real depreciation (all pegs in the candidate countries were established following a 
very sizeable nominal devaluation of the exchange rate) and because of structural reforms leading to 
productivity improvements. In that stage, the limits of external anchoring become evident and disinflation 
strategies can sometimes outlive their usefulness. A number of candidate countries have abandoned their 
fixed peg for a more flexible regime. 
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3.4.2 Exchange rate flexibility, relative price adjustment and trend real exchange rate appreciation 
For some time to come, all countries will exhibit differences in the average price level and price structure 
with the EU and some will still undergo relative price adjustments. They could experience real exchange 
rate appreciation and some real exchange rate variability in the years ahead, as they continue to go through 
transition reforms and a catching-up phase. This fact has consequences for the choice of exchange rate 
regime. Indeed, real appreciation could be achieved through nominal appreciation rather than through 
higher domestic inflation. Reaching low inflation may thus require some nominal exchange rate 
appreciation. 
 
Later on, as the productivity and investment gap narrows in a more mature phase of the catching-up, there 
may be the opposite need for some real downwards exchange rate flexibility, to give room for their 
enhanced production and export capacity.  
 
The trade-off will then be between nominal depreciation and lower domestic inflation. However, at this 
stage of the transition, concerns over competitiveness should not be overplayed, specially in those 
countries with flexible input and output markets, as there is no harmful evidence. With respect to CPI-
based real exchange rates, most of the countries are showing real appreciation, as they have higher inflation 
rates which are not compensated by nominal devaluation. However, ULC-based real exchange rates are 
often showing depreciation, as a result of improved productivity and moderate wage developments. 
Therefore, in general, their competitiveness is not negatively influenced by real exchange rate 
developments. Moreover, there are historical examples in the EU in which real appreciation has actually 
worked as an incentive to upgrade the quality of exports. 
 
In any case, certainly during this phase of the transition, there are therefore sound economic arguments 
which would plead in favour of a more flexible exchange rate regime. 
 
3.4.3 The nature of shocks and the nominal exchange rate 
The traditional criteria for exchange rate regime choice are obviously relevant for the candidate countries 
in the pre-accession phase. Among these criteria, the type of random disturbances that an economy 
undergoes is a factor for determining an appropriate exchange rate regime. Indeed, the effectiveness of 
exchange rate policy as a tool for adjustment will depend primarily on the nature of shocks and on the 
existence of other adjustment mechanisms. 
 
A fixed exchange rate is generally superior if the disturbances to the economy are predominantly domestic 
nominal shocks, such as money market imbalances, whereas a flexible rate is preferable to deal with 
foreign shocks or domestic real shocks, such as productivity shocks or shifts in the demand of domestic 
goods. These results are however based on downwardly rigid costs and price models of output 
determination.  
 
The nature of the shocks of a domestic origin that are likely to characterise, in the next few years, the 
candidates' economies, are obviously of both types. Clearly, a shift in the exchange rate regime in response 
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to the nature of each shock is an unworkable choice. Certain types of nominal shocks, such as banking and 
financial sector crisis, cannot be ruled out all together, in any of the candidate countries, particularly in 
those where reforms have lagged.  
 
With progress towards market reforms and economic integration and greater credibility, the possibility of 
real asymmetric shocks vis-à-vis the euro zone is likely to become less frequent. Nevertheless, real shocks 
could be more frequent than domestic nominal shocks.  
 
In essence, it is the ability of the economy to deal with shocks which determines whether or not the 
exchange rate is an indispensable tool for adjustment. A country characterised by flexible wages and 
prices, does not need exchange rate flexibility since movements in relative prices occur relatively easily. 
Under such conditions, fixing the exchange rate imposes the stability of nominal magnitudes, but does not 
lead to a loss of real flexibility. 
Countries with unresolved rigidities in wage and price determination and poor credibility might find a fixed 
exchange rate regime excessively difficult to sustain, as long as they do not correct these problems. 
 
3.4.4 Small and open economies in the candidate countries and fixed exchange rates 
Many of the candidate countries are small open economies, and all the traditional arguments which are 
used to determine the appropriate exchange rate regimes in small open economies apply also here. The 
standard conclusion on small open economies is that they benefit greatly from pegging their exchange rate 
to that of the main trading partner, as this helps to promote foreign trade by reducing uncertainty about 
import and export prices. In these cases, it is the real exchange rate which adjusts to changing economic 
circumstances and shocks, not through changes in the nominal exchange rate, but through changes in 
wages and prices. For these countries, the flexibility of wages and prices is therefore even more important. 
To date, Estonia’s successful experience with a Currency Board Arrangement provides a credible example 
of the combination of these factors with a sustained track record.  
 
3.4.5 Dealing with capital flows 
A determining factor in exchange rate regime choice will be its appropriateness in dealing with accession-
related capital inflows and the  movement towards capital liberalisation that is part of the Single Market 
acquis. 
 
As accession nears, it can be expected that the attractiveness of the candidates as a destination for foreign 
direct investment will increase, but also that portfolio flows and short term capital inflows, sometimes of a 
speculative nature, increase as interest rates are bid down, but still higher than those prevailing in the euro 
area. In the future, such flows could also increase due to financial innovation and the development of more 
sophisticated financial products on their domestic financial markets. 
 
Generally, capital inflows are easier to deal with under more flexible exchange rates. Exchange rate 
uncertainty can be expected to discourage the more volatile, speculative flows. Furthermore, under a fully 
flexible exchange rate system, capital inflows will lead to an appreciation of the currency, a drop in the 
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relative price of imported goods, and a shift of consumption away from non-tradables, all of which tend to 
alleviate inflationary pressures. 
 
Therefore, all other things being equal, the more flexible the exchange rate, the less likely it is that capital 
inflows will have an inflationary effect. However, faced with large and persistent capital inflows, a 
tightening of fiscal policy is generally the only way of containing inflation and avoiding real appreciation, 
under any exchange rate regime. Moreover, fiscal adjustment will lead to relative price changes when 
markets are flexible. 
 
All these different considerations again do not lead to an unequivocal choice for one regime or the other. 
The conclusion is, again, that no single exchange rate regime is to be preferred for all countries at all times.  
The ultimate choice, therefore, depends on country-specific factors, and may change over time. For this last 
reason, it is very important that countries do not opt for regimes without a realistic exit option. Finally, it 
should be stressed that the consistency of economic policies is more crucial than the choice between fixed 
and floating exchange rates for the candidate countries today. Sound fundamentals are needed to underpin 
a credible commitment to any exchange rate regime. These fundamentals include fiscal discipline, an 
adequately supervised and regulated financial system, well-functioning labour markets, the rule of law, and 
an adequate level of international reserves in the case of a fixed exchange rate.  
 
Furthermore, given the liberalisation of capital inflows that integration to the EU requires, it is clear that 
fiscal policy adjustment is the most effective instrument to reduce internal and external imbalances. Capital 
flows are sensitive to the level of interest rates. This puts the onus on fiscal policies to limit excess 
domestic demand and moderate real appreciation pressures, resulting from successful economic 
transformation and the attraction of foreign investment. In addition, while the financial system is fragile 
and/or underdeveloped – and this is still the case perhaps in all candidate countries – tight fiscal policy 
would be the only safe and robust route to stabilisation. 
 
3.5 The participation of future member states in the ERM2 
 
The ERM2 is a system with a very wide standard fluctuation band, which offers scope for significant 
exchange rate movements around central rates vis-à-vis the euro. In comparison with the EMS, the 
realignment of central rates is facilitated. Participating countries can also establish “closer links” with the 
euro by negotiating narrower fluctuation margins on an individual basis. These features, and in general the 
flexibility provided for by the ERM, could constitute an advantage for the future participation of the 
candidate countries. 
 
The ERM2 could offer future Member States two types of benefits: 
• benefits linked to credibility deriving from a bilateral link to the euro, e.g., in terms of providing an 
anchor for macroeconomic policies, lowering interest rate premia, attracting capital inflows etc. 
• benefits linked to the flexibility of the mechanism, deriving from the width of the standard bands, 
timely realignments and the possibility of closer exchange rate links when appropriate.  
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The transition path to the adoption of the euro would be likely to vary among the candidate countries and a 
series of steps (implying possibly different exchange rate arrangements for each country which would 
evolve over time as economic convergence is achieved) toward a more and more stable exchange rate with 
the euro can be envisaged. A rather diverse set of regimes, within a single broad framework of the ERM2, 
is more likely to prove optimal. The ERM2 framework seems to provide sufficient flexibility to incorporate 
these diverse regimes. 
 
It can be expected that, by the time of accession or shortly after, most candidate countries will have 
achieved levels of inflation, which would allow for a credible entry in the ERM2. It should be noted that 
many candidate countries have already indicated, in the context of the accession negotiations, that they 
intend to join the mechanism as soon as possible after accession, with the anticipation that they can sustain 
a period of participation without realignments to qualify for the adoption of the euro within a minimum 
period of two years. While it is impossible at this stage to assess whether such anticipations are credible, it 
can be expected that some countries will need more extensive exchange rate flexibility or even 
realignments, which could delay their fulfilment of the exchange rate criterion. 
 
All this points to the conclusion that the ERM2 will be an appropriate instrument for the economic 
situation of most candidate countries after accession. 
 
 
4. Summary and conclusions. 
 
The exchange rate policy choice from pre-accession to the adoption of the euro must take into account 
several factors. Among these are: facilitating growth and real convergence, helping integration to the EU, 
adjustment to real shocks, maintaining external balance, and containing exposure to reversible capital 
flows, while preparing for entry in the ERM2 and, in due course, for the full adoption of the euro. There is 
clearly a case for diversity of the exchange rate regimes between now and accession, and possibly also 
beyond. The institutional framework of the Treaty for the progressive monetary integration of the candidate 
countries in EMU should allows for such diversity. The Treaty identifies three distinct phases for the full 
monetary integration of candidate countries: the pre–accesion phase; the accession phase, covering the 
period from accession to adoption of the single currency; and the final phase of the adoption of the euro. 
The implication of each phase for exchange rate policy is: 
 
(1) Prior to accession there is no formal restriction on the choice of exchange rate regime. 
(2) Upon accession, new Member states must adopt an exchange rate policy as a matter of common 
interest (Article 124). 
(3) After accession, although not necessarily immediately, join the ERM2. When the convergence 
criteria are satisfied, the country will adopt the euro. 
The open issue in this sequence is the integration in the ERM2. The key features of the ERM2 are the 
stable but adjustable central rate with standard fluctuation band and that it uses a common procedure for 
the main decisions relating to the conditions of the participation of a country in the mechanism. The 
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multilateral nature of this procedure implies that, prior to the request for participation, it is difficult to 
determine under what conditions a particular currency will be allowed to participate. Moreover, these 
decisions will have to be taken on a case-by-case basis at the time of entry in the mechanism. The ERM2 
could accommodate different situations, and its design will help to avoid unnecessary adaptations or exits 
from current exchange rate regimes provided that the countries’ commitments and objectives are credible 
and in line with those of the ERM2. 
 
 
